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CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: THE
CLASH OF THE FEDERAL AND NEW YORK STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

Timothy M Riselvato*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures those accused of a crime the right to the assistance of defense
counsel in all criminal prosecutions.' State constitutions commonly
express similar guarantees, and New York is no exception. 2 Inevitably, the ambiguities and nuances of constitutional provisions are interpreted by the judiciary;3 thus, governing case law is created.
However, different courts do not always agree. The United States
Supreme Court and the highest court in New York State, the Court of
Appeals, have advanced different rules that determine when ineffective assistance of counsel exists and when justice requires that a conviction be reversed.'
This Comment is an effort to concisely analyze the distinctions between claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
Federal and New York standards. To facilitate this, Section II will

. Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, May 2011; B.A.
Stony Brook University. I wish to thank my family and friends for their support throughout
my legal education, especially my mother, grandmother, and Jen. Special thanks go to the
talented staff of the Touro Law Review for their advice and assistance.
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
3 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) ("Interpretation of
the law and the Constitution is the primary mission of the judiciary ..... (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803))).
4 Compare Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a "reasonably effective" standard for judging the assistance of counsel), with People v. Baldi, 429
N.E.2d 400, 405 (N.Y. 1981) (establishing the "meaningful representation" standard for
judging effective assistance of counsel in New York).

1195

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 4 [2011], Art. 6

TOURO LAWREVIEW

1196

[Vol. 26

detail the evolution of the standards. Section III of the Comment will
endeavor to interpret the relative positive and negative aspects of the
differences between the Federal and New York standards. To accomplish this, there will be a critical exploration of the history of ineffective assistance of counsel rulings, as well as an evaluation of the
reasoning, methodology, and overall integrity of the different approaches. Upon examination, it will become apparent that the federal
and state standards should not be permitted to coexist and that the
New York standard is far superior. Section IV will briefly summarize these findings and set forth a conclusion regarding the disharmony of the two standards. This section will also propose reasoned suggestions for how ineffective assistance of counsel standards should be
most appropriately interpreted.

II.

HISTORY

A.

A Brief Historical Perspective on the Right to
Counsel

The Sixth Amendment provides defendants with the right to
the assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions, which is a guarantee that has been enforced by federal courts since the amendment's
inception.' In terms of how effective such representation must be,
the amendment specifies nothing. It was not until Powell v. Alabama6 that the adequacy of counsel in criminal prosecutions was interpreted by the Supreme Court.' The uniquely dramatic facts of the
case persuaded the Court to conclude that anything less than sufficiently effective representation would be a violation of due process.
Decades later, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the right to have the
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1635, 1638-39 (2003) (indicating
that the right to counsel existed as far back as the seventeenth century when American colonists decided to abandon the English prohibition of counsel "to afford defendants a fighting
chance against the prosecution").
6 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Id. at 71 (indicating that lack of effective counsel is "a denial of due process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment").
8 Id. at 49, 71 (describing that the defendants were illiterate black youths accused of raping two white girls in pre-civil rights era Alabama, cut off from communication with their
family and friends, and faced with severe and life-threatening hostility from the general public).
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assistance of counsel when defending felony charges was affirmed
under both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and held to apply
to the states.9 As a result of Gideon in 1963, it became law that indigent criminal defendants were universally required to have counsel
appointed by the court, unless the right was "completely and intelligently waived.'..o In the wake of Gideon, the right to counsel saw a
steady expansion. Eventually, it would be required that, barring a
knowing and informed waiver, no defendant could be incarcerated for
any criminal offense without representation by counsel at trial." The
right was broadened to apply to the entire spectrum of criminal
charges, from petty offenses to felonies.12
The specifics of what the right to counsel entails has been further elaborated upon by the Court since Gideon.'3 In McMann v.
Richardson,14 the Supreme Court determined that "the right to counsel is the right to the. effective assistance of counsel." 5 What exactly
constituted effective assistance was left nebulous.16 To measure the
effectiveness of counsel without the benefit of clear Supreme Court
rationale, courts on the federal level historically utilized assorted versions of the "mockery of justice" formula.' 7 The basis for this formula seemingly originated from the decision rendered in Diggs v.
Welch,' 8 which held that findings of actual ineffective assistance of
counsel were limited strictly to "cases where the circumstances surrounding the trial shocked the conscience . .. and made the proceed-

ings a farce and a mockery of justice." 9 In regards to what was effective, the farce and mockery standard demanded an extremely low
level of minimum performance.20 This standard doggedly persisted
until 1984 when the Supreme Court redefined the standard for effec' 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
10

Id. at 340.

" Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
12 id
13 See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (indicating that "the

right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel").
14 397 U.S. 759.
1

Id. at 771 n.14.

16 Id. at 771.

17 McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974).

a

148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945).

'
20

Id. at 670.

See id at 669 (reserving actual findings of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
farce and mockery test for only the most extreme cases).
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tive assistance of counsel.2 1
B.

The Influence of Strickland v. Washington

A method for determining what constituted actual effectiveness was not fully characterized by the Supreme Court until Strickland v. Washington.2 2 In Strickland, the Court established that "[t]he
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a
just result." 23
Strickland also established the "reasonably effective" standard
for judging the assistance of counsel.2 4 This standard indicates that
specific duties exist that are associated with the norms of professional
21
practice.
Counsel must meet these standards when representing a
defendant in a criminal trial in order to satisfy reasonable effectiveness. 26 The standards include "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest," a duty to argue for the defendant's position, a duty
"to keep the defendant informed," and also a duty "to consult with
the defendant" on matters of crucial importance.2 7 However, this
does not wholly define what it means to be "reasonably effective."
The standard is nebulous by design, as the Court explains:
These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial
evaluation of attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. . . . No

particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct
can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (establishing the "reasonably effective" standard for
judging the assistance of counsel).
22 See id.
23 Id. at 686.
24 Id. at 687. See also McMann, 397 U.S. at 770-71 (advocating that, in order
to be effective, counsel must be a reasonably competent attorney).
25 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
21

26
27

id
id.
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legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a
criminal defendant.2 8
To evaluate counsel's performance with the "20/20 vision"
that is intrinsically attributed to hindsight would undermine the entire
judicial process, and the Court wanted to avoid such interpretations.2 9
To this end, Strickland imposed a strong presumption that the counsel's performance was reasonably effective,3 0 and "[j]udicial scrutiny
...

must be highly deferential" to the decisions of defense attor-

neys.
In Strickland, the Court created a two prong test that must be
affirmatively proven if a defendant is convicted and subsequently advances a claim that the assistance of his or her counsel was so woefully unsound that fairness necessitates a reversal of the decision.3 2
First, there must be a showing of deficiency wherein "counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."3 3 The second prong requires that counsel's errors be prejudicial, and of such a
substantial caliber as to render the trial unfair.34 Errors by counsel
that do not affect the outcome of the trial, even if they are substantially unreasonable, are not considered prejudicial.3 5 "The defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." 36
C.

People v. Baldi and New York

Similar to the Constitution of the United States, the New York
State Constitution also contains a provision which guarantees the

Id. at 688-89.
Id. at 689-90.
30 Strickland,466 U.S. at 689.
31 Id. at 689. See also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 334 n.7 (1997) (noting the new
standard is highly deferential).
32 Strickland,466 U.S.
at 687.
3 Id.
28
29

34

id.

35 Id. at 691.
36

Id. at 694.
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right to the effective assistance of counsel.3 7 The New York Court of
Appeals first put forth a constitutional argument for the effective assistance of counsel in People v. Tomaselli. Mirroring the evolution
of the federal standard, in Tomaselli New York initially adopted a
"mockery of justice" standard.3 9 The standard remained in place for
years. It yasn't until the late 1970s that New York began to deviate
from this traditional formula.4 0 In 1976 and 1979, the New York
Court of Appeals found two instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel to be unconstitutional without resorting to the mockery of
justice test. 41 The mockery of justice test would soon be abandoned
as a whole. It was evident to the court that "a criminal trial should be
more efficient, and fairer, than one that rises just above the level of
farce."4 2
In People v. Baldi 4 3 the New York Court of Appeals redefined what effective assistance of counsel in New York meant when
it stated, "[s]o long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of
a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation,
the constitutional requirement will have been met."" This flexible
standard "necessarily hinges upon the facts and circumstances of
each particular case."4 5
This "meaningful representation" standard, which evaluates
the totality of the circumstances, was established in New York three
years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland.46 At the
time, the decision applied only at the trial level.4 7 Subsequently, the
New York Court of Appeals had occasion to adopt the federal StrickN.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
165 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1960).
Id. at 553.
See People v. Aiken, 380 N.E.2d 272, 274 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Droz, 348 N.E.2d
882 (N.Y. 1976); see also People v. Medina, 375 N.E.2d 768, 772 (N.Y. 1978).
41 See People v. Bell, 401 N.E.2d 180, 181 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that a litany of errors
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel); Droz, 348 N.E.2d at 882 (evaluating effective
assistance as a question of degree of adequate performance and cumulative error).
42 People v. Stultz, 810 N.E.2d 883, 887 (N.Y. 2004).
3
3
39
4
880,

'

429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y.198 1).
Id. at 405.

45 People v. De Marco, 822 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).

4 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
47 Id. See also People v. Flores, 639 N.E.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. 1994); People v. Saunders, 753
N.Y.S.2d 620, 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
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land standard regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, but instead
elected to retain the Baldi standard. 4 8 Almost a quarter-century after
Baldi, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Stultz49 in
favor of extending the Baldi standard to the appellate level in regard
to the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel.50 The highest court of the
state went on to note that the Baldi standard, which ensures representation that is meaningful, "comports with both the Sixth Amendment
and our own state constitutional sensibilities.""

III.

ANALYSIS

What clearly differentiates the federal approach from the
standard articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Baldi is the
prejudice prong of the Stricklandtest.52 The Strickland test requires a
reasonably probable showing of "but-for" causation between counsel's prejudicial ineffectiveness and the defendant's loss at trial.5 3
Prejudice under Baldi is evaluated in terms of "fairness of the process
as a whole rather than its particular impact on the outcome of the
case." 54
A.

Can and Should the Two Standards Coexist Under
the Law?

A point of inquiry is whether New York's standard should
even be permitted under the reigning federal law of the United States.
In accordance with the Supremacy Clause, states are barred from implementing their own standards of ineffectiveness if they are more
burdensome or demanding than what federal law dictates.5 5 Howev48

49

People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 589 (N.Y. 1998).
810 N.E.2d 883.

'o Id. at 887-88.
1

Id. at 886.

Compare Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."), with Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405 (indicating that "trial tactics
which terminate unsuccessfully do not automatically indicate ineffectiveness").
" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.").
4 See Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
ss Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 888 n.12.
52
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er, states are entitled to take the opposite approach. 56 "In interpreting
their own constitutions, states are free to provide greater protection
than the Federal Constitution requires. 7 In this sense, the Federal
Constitution sets forth a minimum level of rights-a floor-to which
states must adhere, but may surpass.""
The Federal Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel has not been universally adhered to by the states. 9 Some
states, such as New York, have chosen to retain their own preferential
standards of evaluation. 60 This does not mean, however, that they are
wholly separate. The standards clash when federal writs of habeas
corpus come into play.
[A] state prisoner seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel must show more than simply that he
meets the Strickland standard. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), the state
court's decision rejecting his claim is to be reviewed
under a more deferential standard than simply whether
that decision was correct.

. .

. [The federal court] must

defer to the state court's rejection of the claim, and
must deny the writ unless (to the extent pertinent here)
the state-court adjudication (1) "was contrary to," or
(2) "involved an unreasonable application of," clearly
established federal law "as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States."6 1
What the AEDPA essentially demands is that a habeas petitioner
must show that the state court applied Strickland unreasonably or
Id.; see also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983) (holding that states have
the freedom to permit and enforce greater protections than those demanded by the U.S. Constitution).
" Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 888 n.12.
58 Id. (citation omitted).
59 See, e.g., People v. Henry, 744 N.E.2d 112, 114 (N.Y. 2000); Briones v. State, 848 P.2d
966, 976 (Haw. 1993).
6 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 589.
Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 67 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)
(West 2010)). See also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (stating that unreasonable application of a rule can result in granting writ).
56
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used its own standard that is contrary to Strickland.6 2 The Second
Circuit has ruled on multiple occasions that New York's standard is
not contrary to Stricklandand therefore the rule is in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the AEDPA.6 3
From an over-arching perspective, the standards appear to be
in harmony. Whether state or federal, the goal is to ensure reasonable
assistance in the interest of fairness. 64 However, upon closer examination, the different standards appear to have a very basic contradiction. The Second Circuit, in Henry v. Poole,5 although bound by
precedent to recognize the standards as non-contrary, opined on this
incongruity as follows:
[I]n order to be "contrary to" the federal standard, a
state-law principle need not be diametrically different
from, or opposite in character to, or mutually opposed
to, the federal standard in toto. Rather .. . if the state
court's rejection of a claim is grounded on part of a
state-law principle that is inconsistent with part of the
Strickland standard, it meets the AEDPA "contrary to"
test.

. .

. [I]n light of the Strickland principle that an

ineffective assistance claim is established if the court
concludes that there is a reasonable probability that
but for counsel's professionally deficient performance
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, we find it difficult to view so much of the New
York rule as holds that "whether defendant would
have been acquitted of the charges but for counsel's
errors is .. . not dispositive," as not "contrary to" the
prejudice standard established by Strickland.66
In Henry, Judge Sack's concurring opinion was heavily influenced by
the criticism levied against New York's continued use of a standard
62 Henry, 409 F.3d at 70-71.
63 Id. at 69-70. See also Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir.
2003); Lindstadt v.
Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the Baldi standard "is not 'diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed' to the standard articulated in Strickland" (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 364 (2000))); Loliscio v.
Goord, 263 F.3d 178, 189 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001).
64 Henry, 409 F.3d at 70.
6s 409 F.3d 48.

6 Id. at 70-71 (quoting Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588) (citation omitted).
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that could be interpreted as contrary to Strickland.67 Belying a belief
that the two standards are, in fact, contrary, Judge Sack went so far as
to state, "we might be well advised to consider the appeal for en banc
review as a means to reconsider the issue."6 8
Regardless of which standard is more rational and prudent, "a
state court's incorrect legal determination has [niever been allowed to
stand because it was reasonable." 6 9 It has been a long-standing and
well-respected rule that the federal court system has "an independent
obligation to say what the law is." 0 The inherent difference in the
standards, as noted by the Henry decision, should trigger a "contrary
to" analysis that reevaluates the Baldi standard and finds it in violation of "clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."71
New York would not be unique if, as a state, the interpretation
of its highest court regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was
defeated for not complying with the federal standard. The Supreme
Court of Virginia advanced a standard based upon what they viewed
as a modification of Strickland that resulted from the Supreme
Court's decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell.72 The Virginia standard
held that "focus on outcome determination was insufficient standing
alone."7 3 The Supreme Court ruled that Virginia's interpretation was
not supported by the decision in Lockhart, which applied to very specific circumstances when prejudice ought not to be part of the equation, and as a result was contrary to Strickland.7 4
Virginia's approach was not unlike New York's Baldi standard, holding that "but for" causation was "not dispositive."7 5 Each
standard endeavored to distance itself from requiring a causal relationship between ineffective assistance of counsel and an unfavorable
result for the defendant, which is essentially the heart of Strickland's
67 Id. at 72-73 (Sack, J., concurring).
68 Id. (emphasis omitted).

Williams, 529 U.S. at 384 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
70 Id.

7' 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West 2010).
72 506 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1993); Williams v. Warden of the Mecklenburg Corr.
Ctr. (Williams l), 487 S.E.2d 194, 199 (Va. 1997).
71 Williams, 529 U.S. at 414; Williams I, 487 S.E.2d at 199.
74 Williams, 529 U.S. at 414.
7 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
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prejudice prong.7 6 Virginia's standard did not survive, and New
York's standard, due to its contrary nature and despite its superior
protection, warrants a similar fate under prevailing law.17
B.

The Numerous Fundamental Shortcomings of
Strickland and Why Baldi Is Preferable

Having illustrated how Strickland and Baldi are contrary to
one another, the next question to confront is whether it is appropriate
to hold a superior standard unconstitutional. It is well settled that
contradictory state and federal laws cannot coexist.7 8 However, while
the current law may suggest that Baldi will be defeated by Strickland,
this is not necessarily the optimum solution in the interest of justice.
In true Darwinian style, the standard that is the most fit should be the
one to survive. If only one of the two standards can exist, the Supreme Court should consider abandoning Strickland and adopting the
Baldi standard on the federal level.
When the Supreme Court is faced with issues that arise from
the application of different standards, it is the standards themselves
that should be evaluated. The Strickland test is the more rigid of the
two and will often be very difficult for the defendant to actually
meet. 79 On the other hand, the pro-defendant Baldi standard is plainly more achievable.8 0 The cause for this divergence, and the point of
contention, is the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. There are
fundamental difficulties inherent in proving that a convicted defendant would have garnered a different outcome had his counsel's assistance been effective.
1.

Counsel's Role in Obscuring Findings of
Ineffectiveness and Prejudice

Cases that may seem to be insurmountable at first glance can
See id. at 587-88; Williams, 529 U.S. at 371.
n Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 887.
78 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
7 See Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 30 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("To
require defendants to specify the grounds for their appeal and show that they have some merit would impose a heavy burden. . . .").
80 See Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587, 589 (referencing the Baldi standard as one that is
both "flexible" and "discrete").
76

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 4 [2011], Art. 6

1206

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 26

be overcome by effective counsel.81 Likewise, effective counsel may
possess the ability to rebut the arguments and cross-examine the evidence advanced by the government in ways that simply cannot be
discovered in any other manner.8 2 Situations where competent lawyering has overcome supposedly impossible odds are prevalent, and it
is accepted that such happenings are entirely possible.
However,
when counsel does a terrible job, the natural result is that the opposition looks invincible. In this inverse relationship, the worse defense
counsel performs, the more unbeatable the prosecution's case seems
when it appears before the reviewing court. If the prosecution's case
seems overpowering, the reviewing court will be unable to find prejudice, even though the weakness of the case might be directly attributable to the weakness of the originally defective counsel. The
Strickland standard thus becomes a metaphorical Ouroboros, the
mythical serpent that perpetually swallows its own tail. The difference that competent, "meaningful" representation has the potential to
make in breaking such a vicious cycle cannot be feasibly quantified
by any accurate measure. It is this "meaningful" representation that
the New York State Constitution requires. 84
Additionally, finding evidence that proves prejudice may be
rendered difficult or impossible to accomplish precisely because of
counsel's ineffectiveness and original evidentiary failures. Practical
problems that manifest through ineptitude create holes in the record
that make proving prejudice exceedingly difficult.8 6 Evidence, once
readily accessible, runs the risk of being forever lost to time if it is
not obtained with reasonable diligence.8 7 Memories fade, and when
81 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82 See id.
83 See Michael Mello, Nine Scorpions in a Bottle, 44 CRiM. L. BULL. ART. I (describing

the sincere belief that competent lawyering could even have prevented the execution of infamous serial killer Ted Bundy, who desired acclaimed attorney, Millard Farmer, as counsel,
and apparently was going to receive his services pro bono until the state trial judge denied
the request because Farmer had an outstanding contempt citation).
8 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587 (quoting Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405).
85 See Strickland,466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86 See id. at 710 n.4 ("When defense counsel fails to take certain actions, not because he is
'compelled' to do so, but because he is incompetent, it is often . . . difficult to ascertain the
prejudice consequent upon his omissions.").
87 See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 62 (1968) ("[D]immed memories or the death of witnesses is bound to render it difficult or impossible to secure crucial testimony on disputed
issues of fact.").
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tasked with supplementing prior information, the defendant must
confront "a real possibility that the parties present . . . may no longer

be able to recall the proceeding in detail." 8
Counsel may also actively attempt to conceal incompetence
out of self-interest.8 9 The cooperation of the allegedly defective
counsel can be essential to proving ineffective assistance. 90 However, their non-cooperation can make proving the claim practically impossible. 9 1 "[A]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim is unlikely
to succeed if the criminal defense lawyer vigorously contests the allegations of ineffectiveness." 92 Strickland itself acknowledged the
necessity of inquiring into verbal exchanges between counsel and
counseled when determining ineffectiveness. 93 There may be no other realistic way to discover exactly what information passed from the
client to his or her counsel. The actions of counsel are often based
upon information garnered from conversations with clients, making
inquiry into those conversations critical to fair assessments of strategy and performance. However, it is evident that garnering such information will meet resistance from an involved party.
A hostile disposition from the attorney of the accused towards
an ineffective assistance claim is easy to understand when considering the myriad of incentives at play. It does not take a legal scholar
to see that "[a] client's former attorney will be less than enthusiastic
about helping a former client publicly criticize his [or her] representation."94 A proven claim of ineffective assistance can inherently dis-

8 Raisa Litmanovich, In the Name of Efficiency: How the Massachusetts District Courts
are Lobbying Away the ConstitutionalRights ofIndigent Defendants, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 293, 311 (2009) (illustrating that this problem is especially prevalent regarding anything
that occurs off the record, especially during unrecorded "lobby conferences" between attorneys and judges that are standard practice in certain jurisdictions).
89 See United States v. Livingston, 425 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560 (D. Del. 2006) (demonstrating that the attorney actively concealed his own incompetence resulting in ineffective assistance).
9 See Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights

We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 7 (1995).
91 Id.
92 id.

9 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 ("[I]nquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant
may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be
critical to a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions.").
9 Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called)Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System
in Need ofReform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 27 (2002).
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credit a lawyer's ability, pride, and professional reputation.95 Additionally, these claims may draw the attention of disciplinary bodies to
misconduct that might otherwise have flown under the proverbial radar. 96 Original counsel might potentially be faced with separate actions for professional negligence, or even worse, the tortious act of
attorney malpractice. The predictable desire to avoid any potential
liability for malpractice is "a powerful incentive not to cooperate or
otherwise be helpful to a former client seeking to prove an ineffectiveness claim." 98 A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, if defeated, eliminates the ability to sue for criminal malpractice in the
majority of jurisdictions,9 9 including New York.o The defense attorney therefore has an interest in seeing such claims fail for his or
her own security. Relying on the altruism of the original defective
counsel to act against his or her own interest is dubious at best. A
standard that essentially requires counsel to admit to being so woefully deficient as to have been the cause of his or her client's conviction
cannot realistically be considered to serve the interests of justice.
This is not to say that an attorney will never willingly take a
metaphorical bullet for his or her client. Sometimes it will occur
even when counsel has done nothing wrong. In Barclay v. Spitzer,'0 o
counsel willingly testified that he did not call a witness who might
have helped absolve his client' 0 2 because he did not adequately prepare for his role at the trial.103 This admission, if accepted, would
have indicated that failure to call the witness was not part of any

9s Id.
9 See id. at 28 (noting that although "bringing or prevailing in an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim does not automatically trigger disciplinary proceedings in any jurisdiction,"
they still generate publicity that the allegedly defective counsel would certainly rather
avoid).
9 See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237, 1238-39 (Ala. 1983) (illustrating that victory
on a claim of ineffectiveness does not guarantee victory on a claim of malpractice).
9 Duncan, supra note 94, at 28.
9 Id. at 27-28.
' Gill v. Blau, 507 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (ruling that failure to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel acts as collateral estoppel for legal malpractice claims).
101 371 F. Supp. 2d 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
102 Id. at 275 (claiming that the witness, who was the long-time doctor of the accused,
would have testified that Barclay was physically incapable of having performed the alleged
rape).
103 id
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strategy, but the result of self-acknowledged neglect. 104 The federal
district court was not swayed, and held that counsel's "rhetoric did
not represent his real evaluation, but was essentially a ploy to obtain
a new trial by a lawyer more devoted to his client than to his own
reputation."' 0 5 Evaluation of the record led the court to believe that
counsel was actually talented and skilled during the proceedings.1 06
Counsel had met the minimum constitutional requirements despite his
insistence to the contrary, and the issue regarding the non-calling of
the witness was not significant enough to amount to prejudice.10 7
In evaluating this case, the judge opined that, "[s]kepticism is
particularly called for when an excellent attorney doing a highly credible job for the defense suddenly pleads ineptitude. In this respect,
the New York State's standard for determining competent representation seems more useful than the federal standard."' 08 Barclay gave
the federal court some consternation when attempting to apply the
two prongs of Strickland,leaving the court wishing it could use New
York's superior standard instead.109 Use of the meaningful representation test set forth by Baldi would have led to a more straightforward determination regarding the satisfaction of constitutional
rights in cases like Barclay where ineffectiveness is suspiciously admitted.
2.

The Iniquity of a Standard Where the
Superficially Guilty Are Essentially Found
Not Deserving of Effective Counsel

A crucial concern regarding an outcome-determinative test
like Strickland is the fact that if the amount of evidence against a defendant is sufficiently large, the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim will never be considered under the Strickland test because the

104 Id.

Id. at 277.
106 Barclay, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
107Id. at 281.
18 Id. at 283.
10

109 See id. at 284 ("The New York State test should be deemed to satisfy federal constitutional standards in cases such as the instant one.... The distinguished New York courts and
New York's excellent criminal justice system deserves more in the way of comity than is
afforded in some federal proceedings.").
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result is presumed to be unchangeable. 1 0 This arguably promotes judicial economy and prevents criminals from walking away from convictions with impunity because of "technicalities." Furthermore, it
reduces delays, averts retrials, and gives respectful deference to convictions." 1 From a perspective of unfeeling mechanical efficiency, it
is not difficult to see the appeal. It is an unfortunate reality that
"[t]he rapid processing of cases, the emphasis on pleas, and the evaluation of judges based on their rate of disposition have long been the
modus operandi in the state criminal courts."' 12 The Supreme Court
in Strickland appears to have been operating under a fear of opening
the proverbial floodgates of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
The Court has no doubt satisfied its agenda in that regard, because
the Strickland standard is plainly more burdensome and will defeat a
larger amount of claims.
Some years after issuing his dissent in Strickland, Justice
Marshall remarked on the utter absence of winning ineffective assistance of counsel claims since the majority's decision and assured the
country that "the explanation for this lassitude is not that Strickland
ushered in a golden new age of uniformly competent assistance."' 13
The reason was, of course, that the new standard made defeating ineffective assistance claims practically effortless. 1 14 An evaluation of
counsel's performance does not even necessarily have to occur;"' if
it is easier to disqualify a claim on the grounds of insufficient prejudice, then that is the course that is followed." 6 However, under such
circumstances, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are unceremoniously relegated to failure because prejudice simply cannot be
proven.
Those who are overtly guilty are subject to a proverbial cointoss, where they may or may not benefit from their constitutional
no See People v. Henriquez, 818 N.E.2d 1125, 1140 (N.Y. 2004) (holding that overwhelming evidence against the defendant does not excuse the obligation of defense counsel
to challenge the prosecution in an adversarial manner).
I' Williams, 529 U.S. at 386.
112 Richard Klein, The Constitutionalizationof In Effective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD.
L. REv. 1433, 1478-79 (1999).
113 Hon. Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit, Annual Judicial Conference Second Judicial Circuit of
the United States (Sept. 9, 1988), in 125 F.R.D. 197, Sept. 1988, at 202.
114 Id. at 202-03.

1s Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 n.14 (2000).
116 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
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right to the effective aid of counsel."' Should they be lucky and receive effective assistance of counsel, then justice is served and they
have received everything the Constitution entitles them to. Should
they be unlucky and receive ineffective assistance from their counsel,
they are left with no recourse and have not received an intrinsic constitutional right that is "necessary to insure fundamental human rights
of life and liberty."' 1 8 As Justice Marshall noted in his original dissent to Strickland, "[e]very defendant is entitled to a trial in which his
interests are vigorously and conscientiously advocated by an able
lawyer. A proceeding in which the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the State does not ... constitute due process."" 9 Indeed, it is a logical legal conclusion that
"[i]neffective, incompetent, or inadequate representation is the same
as no counsel at all." 20
What stringent requirements might save in terms of judicial
economy, they cost dearly in other areas. As one concerned judge recently noted:
There is an illogical correlation between our present
ineffective assistance standard as applied and our goal
of fair process and not convicting innocent people and
insuring the right to counsel as constitutionally guaranteed. What is the hidden cost of convicting innocent
people to the taxpayer, to the defendant, to the state
that inevitably pays for the new trial, to the citizenry's
confidence in the judiciary and the criminal justice

system?'21
The Supreme Court has conceded that its current standard, which requires a showing of but-for causation between the attorney's defective performance and the unfavorable outcome, demands a "needed
prophylaxis in situations where [the ordinary requirements of] Strickland [are] evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defend" See Kinrnelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986) (stating that the effective assistance of counsel is not solely a right reserved for the innocent).
118 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
1l9 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

120 State v. McKay, 234 N.W.2d 853, 857 (N.D. 1975) (citing State v. Keller,
223 N.W.
698, 699 (N.D. 1929)).
121 State v. Henry, No. 2007-L-142, 2009 WL 653051,
at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. March 13,
2009).
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ant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."l 22 The use of the term
"prophylaxis" by the Court is rather apropos, as it relates the Strickland standard itself to a disease requiring treatment.123
In New York, overt guilt is not a basis for deprivation of the
constitutional right to counsel.124 The State insists that "the Constitution must be applied in all cases to be effective and, for that reason,
'our legal system is concerned as much with the integrity of the judicial process as with the issue of guilt or innocence.' "125 This balancing of interests ensures universal application of the Constitution and
thus helps protect the innocent as well as the guilty.126 The New
York courts, unlike those that embrace the Strickland standard, will
not deny constitutional rights based on a determination that, essentially, the defendant does not deserve them.127
There exists a presumption of innocence at the heart of America's criminal justice system.12 8 Counsel has a responsibility to challenge the prosecution in an adversarial manner and force it to prove
the heavy burden necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 129 A trial lacking effective assistance of counsel is fundamentally unfair, and the "meaningful representation" standard of analysis
is more likely to defeat that unfairness. How not utilizing such a
standard can be deemed permissible, aside from a mere theory of judicial economy, might have something to do with "the unacknowledged but pervasive belief that anyone who has been arrested is
guilty[,]" also known as the "guilty anyway syndrome."o3 0 This belief, so innately antithetical to the core tenants of fundamental fairMickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002).
Id.
124Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
125 Id. (quoting People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d 628, 631 (N.Y.
1963)).
126 See Donovan, 193 N.E.2d
at 631.
The worst criminal, the most culpable individual, is as much entitled to
the benefit of a rule of law as the most blameless member of society. To
disregard violation of the rule because there is proof in the record to per122
123

suade us of a defendant's guilt would .

.

. endanger the rights of even

those who are innocent.
Id.
127

Id
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
129 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657
(1984).
130 Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do To Improve the Delivery of
CriminalDefense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 293, 311 (2002).
128
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ness, is speculated to be widespread throughout the criminal justice
system, if not society as a whole."' Therefore, fewer tears are shed
when the superficially guilty are denied effective assistance and the
outrage at the denial of constitutionally protected rights simply is not
there. There is not much sympathy to go around for those who are
"guilty anyway."
A concern about standards that do not strictly require a showing of prejudice on the outcome, like New York's Baldi standard, is
that defendants who are actually guilty will be set free upon the
world, whereas Strickland's prejudice prong would keep them off the
streets.132 This is not the case. It is only in situations where a superficially guilty defendant can demonstrate that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel that this concern would arise. 33 Even
under the New York standard, proving that counsel was ineffective is
no simple venture.' 3 4 Furthermore, meritorious ineffective assistance
of counsel claims are remedied via new trials.' 35 If the deficiency of
the original defense counsel truly was "harmless," the result will
simply be another conviction.3 3 True guilt should and will be found
in a trial where the defendant has been afforded all the fundamentally
fair protections demanded by the Constitution. ' Anything less
would impugn the integrity of the courts, and a slightly greater expenditure of judicial resources is justified to avoid such harm. Courts
at the trial level may also be further incentivized to correct errors of
counsel when they see them to avoid reversal on appeal.
Even if effective assistance of counsel would not be enough to
secure an acquittal or other form of victory, it can certainly mitigate
131 Id. (going so far as to suggest that this belief is nearly universal and
is "a major hindrance to improving criminal defense services").

132 Id. at 312.
133

d

People v. Hobot, 646 N.E.2d 1102, 1103 (N.Y. 1995) ("To prevail on his claim that he
was denied effective assistance of trial counsel, defendant bears the well-settled, high burden
of demonstrating that he was deprived of a fair trial by less than meaningful representation."
(emphasis added)).
135 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2009) (stating that in New York, a judgment made in violation of the state or federal constitutional rights of the defendant may be
vacated upon motion and a new trial commenced as a remedy); FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (stating a
similar federal rule).
13 United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
' Cf Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (noting that in some instances, the over-arching focus on
fundamental fairness must affect the Strickland analysis).
134
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penalties. Effective counsel can quite literally be the difference between life and death in cases that involve capital punishment.'3 8 Take
the chilling example of Gary Graham, described as a "textbook example of how bad lawyering sends poor people to death row." 39
Graham was an inmate convicted of murder in the state of Texas who
filed for a writ of habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel.14 0 Graham was represented by the appropriately named attorney, Ronald Mock.141 Mock boasts the dubious distinction of having "had more clients sentenced to death than any lawyer in the country." 4 2 Mock had been reprimanded by the Texas Bar Association on
several occasions, had multiple accusations of ineffective assistance
of counsel lobbied against him, and in regards to the substantial number of complaints, went so far as to sardonically remark, "I have a
permanent parking spot at the grievance committee." 43
Graham asserted that in his role as counsel, Mock failed to
"ask 'the obvious questions,' " specifically claiming
that counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation, failed to interview eyewitnesses to the offense,
. . . failed to present an alibi defense, and failed to in-

troduce ballistics evidence to show that the gun taken
from Graham when he was arrested was not the mur-

der weapon.144
The court acknowledged that even if Mock's performance
was held to be deficient, Graham could not satisfy the prejudice
prong of the Stricklandtest and thus could not adequately claim ineffective assistance of counsel.145 Gary Graham was subsequently executed by lethal injection with questions about his counsel still linger138 See Sara Rimer & Raymond Bonner, Texas Lawyer's Death Row Record a Concern,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at Al (portraying an attorney, unqualified for handling capital
cases, alleging that more of his clients have been sentenced to death than those of any other
attorney).
139 id.

1

Graham v. Collins, 829 F. Supp. 204, 206 (S.D. Tex. 1993).

141 Id. at 209.

142 Rimer & Bonner, supra note 138 (indicating that this distinction is self-admitted and
merely what he believes is the case).
143 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144 Graham, 829 F. Supp. at 209.
145

id,
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ing in the minds of many. 146
Mock's performance may justly be considered to have been
less than meaningful. New York has recognized that, despite strong
evidence of guilt, pervasive and thoughtless errors of counsel without
any strategic or legitimate basis constitute ineffectiveness. 14 7 The
deleterious impact of unreasonable strategy can be compounded by
other shortcomings, such as incomplete cross-examination, evidentiary missteps, and the failure to object when warranted. 148 The Baldi
standard, if it had been applied in the jurisdiction, may very well have
saved Mr. Graham's life.
The outcome-determinative element of the Strickland test,
when treated as an absolute, is fundamentally flawed. The Supreme
Court in Lockhart noted that "[t]o set aside a conviction or sentence
solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel's error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does
not entitle him."l 49 In a case such as Graham, the defense attorney's
failure to take certain steps was deemed to not have been prejudicial
on the outcome.150 Conversely, it is simple to envision how certain
intentionally disreputable or dishonorable acts could have outcomechanging results. Consider a case where an argument for ineffective
assistance of counsel arises as a result of counsel's refusal to facilitate the defendant's suggestion to take actions that are potentially
beneficial to his or her case, but are ethically unallowable.' 5 ' Lies or
misrepresentations are straightforward examples of such actions, and
there can be no doubt that it is, reasonably probable that if a lawyer
employs such tactics at trial, their use could yield a different result.152
In this hypothetical example, a broader overview of the circumstances is demanded in order to properly determine that no unfair
146 See Rimer & Bonner, supra note 138 (noting that then Governor George W. Bush was
not one of the individuals with doubts, as the future president was vehemently convinced
that everyone executed in Texas during his administration was guilty).
147 People v. Miller, 880 N.Y.S.2d 386, 386 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (stating that multiple
significant errors of counsel cannot be overlooked).
* Id. at 385-86.
149Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369-70.
150 Graham, 829 F. Supp. at 209.
151 See Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 370; Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986) (illustrating
a scenario where defendant unsuccessfully argued that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel based upon counsel's refusal to comply with his desires to present testimony tainted
by perjury).
152 Lockhart, 506 U.S.
at 370.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 4 [2011], Art. 6

TOURO LAWREVIEW

1216

[Vol. 26

prejudice exists.153 Merely looking at the outcome without considering ethical obligations of counsel is insufficient. Finding that counsel
was not ineffective in such a situation would be considered a rare ex5 4 New York's "meaningful representaception under Strickland.1
tion" standard, on the other hand, would defeat the claim soundly and
straightforwardly without the need to even evaluate causation or invoke exceptions.155 Meaningful representation is inherently ethical
representation.
From a broader view, the actual feasibility of fairly performing what the Strickland test demands is questionable. Strickland
takes pains to eliminate the use of hindsight,' 5 6 but in the process creates an inherent paradox when endeavoring to objectively evaluate
past prejudice.
It is impossible to pretend that you have no knowledge
of presented evidence after you have heard that evidence, you know it exists, and it has been admitted. In
fact, the second prong of Strickland requires the "but
for" showing of prejudice, retrospectively. It is like
reading the ending to a novel before you read the
book. . . . The present Strickland analysis creates a

conflict between the objective reasonable requirements of the first prong of the analysis, and the subjective remedy of the second prong, which results in establishing a broad standard for competency which at
some point interferes with the defendant's right to a
fair trial and right to counsel."
When determining what was or was not prejudicial, the absence of
hindsight is little more than a judicially created fiction. Coupling that
fiction with a mandate to afford a wide breadth to what is competent
representation cannot, and does not, produce just results.

'

Id. at 370 n.3.

1 See Strickland,466 U.S. at 695, 697 ("A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a
lawless decisionmaker .... ).
.. Henry, 744 N.E.2d at 113.
156 Strickland,466 U.S. at 689.
Is. Henry, 2009 WL 653051, at *8.
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The Burden Inversion of Strickland and the
Unreasonably Low Level of Performance
from Counsel it Permits

With a presumption of the competence and adequacy of defense counsel in place, under Strickland it is the aggrieved defendant
who is charged with the lofty task of proving that counsel was ineffective and prejudicial.1 8 This does not comport with traditional notions of justice.'59 "For the defendant to shoulder the burden of having to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have been
acquitted but for counsel's ineffectiveness, is just another way of saying that the defendant must show that he was innocent." 60 Strickland's "but-for" prong creates a situation where, even after an error
has been identified, the defendant still must prove that such error was
prejudicial and the cause of the unfavorable outcome.16 The burden
falls on the wrong shoulders.
In traditional harmless error analysis, once the error
has been shown by the defendant to have occurred,
then the state has the burden of proving the absence of
prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [T]his is

consistent with the basic concept of American justice
that the state has the burden of proving the defendant's
guilt, as opposed to the totalitarian regimes ...

[that]

assume guilt and require the defendant to prove inno-

cence.162
This burden inversion stands as one of the most prominent failings of
Strickland. It is a failing that can be avoided by utilizing New York's
Baldi standard, which does not demand satisfaction of the prejudice
63
Baldi merely requires a showing that repreprong in Strickland.1
sentation was not "meaningful," not that the defendant was actually

innocent.164
158 Hernandez v. United States, 839 F. Supp. 140, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
159 See Klein, supra note 112, at 1467-69.
160 Klein, supra note 112, at 1468.
161

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

162 Klein, supra note 112, at 1468-69.
163 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
164 Id.
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Strickland further hinders a defendant's ability to actually
prove his or her counsel was ineffective by mandating that review be
"highly deferential" to the defense attorney's original decisions. 165
Establishing ineffectiveness can be accomplished by proving that
counsel's chosen course of action was based upon unsound strategy
and was unreasonable under the prevailing norms of the profession.166
As the Court feared in Strickland, second-guessing counsel's assistance after an unfavorable result may make it "all too tempting" for
the Court to reach the conclusion that counsel's performance was unreasonable.16 7 Yet attorneys inexplicably seem to be islands unto
themselves in this regard, as courts do not shy away from secondguessing the decisions of other professionals. "The standard is 'reasonable professional competence' for malpractice suits against physicians and surgeons, accountants, and architects. Certainly the harm
and loss of liberty resulting to a defendant because of an incompetent
attorney may be far greater than the damage done to a client of a negligent accountant or architect." 68 The idea that the work of allegedly
ineffective accountants should be presumed sufficient or given high
deference is laughable. Yet, equally professional attorneys are afforded such respect despite not truly warranting it.
Under the pall of the high deference requirement in Strickland, it would be an understatement to say that persuading the courts
to reach a conclusion that counsel was unreasonably operating outside professional norms is difficult. Consider that counsel has been
found to be effective when an attorney failed to offer forensic evidence that defendant was not even driving the vehicle in a negligent
homicide case involving a fatal automobile wreck.169 Unbelievably,
this is not even the most outrageous example. An attorney might suffer the debilitating effects of mental illness, but nonetheless be considered effective.170 Counsel can be found to be effective even if he
"' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. See also Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333-34 n.7 (noting the standard is highly deferential).
" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
161 Id. at 689.
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 640-41

(1986).
Peterson v. Kennedy, 532 F. Supp. 113, 115 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (presenting that such
forensic evidence would have corroborated testimony that defendant was actually the passenger of the vehicle, not the driver).
170 Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691, 715-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(indicating that the pe-
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or she is literally falling asleep on the job, slumbering through portions of the trial.' 7 ' There is an old expression used to describe situations where minimal effort is given in an uncommitted fashion; counsel might be said to "phone it in."' 7 2 Counsel can literally appear at a
plea hearing via speaker-phone only and be found effective."' Likewise, counsel can be intoxicated throughout the proceedings and still
skirt around findings of ineffectiveness.' 7 4 Counsel can even outright
personally insult the jury and jury members' families and still not be
sufficiently ineffective."'
Those outrageous examples of defense attorney behavior
might pass muster under Strickland,but are much less likely to do so
titioner's attorney who, amidst other alleged failings, was repeatedly stricken with bouts of
disorientation and irrationality; the court performed informal inquiries into his sanity after
each incident and discovered that he was essentially cracking under the substantial pressure
he found himself under; this "mental fatigue" was found to not have prejudiced his client).
But see Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1944) (holding that with sufficient proof, mental incapacity and the unsound mind of counsel should be held to be a violation of due process).
171 Moore v. State, 227 S.W.3d 421, 426, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that a
"'nap' . . . of ... temporary duration" was not enough to warrant a presumption of prejudice
under Strickland and that counsel is not ineffective if counsel's behavior is "like a schoolboy
lost in a daydream").
172 See United States v. Hernandez, No. CRIM.05-047, 2005 WL 1244918, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
May 24, 2005) (holding that the witness may not testify by telephone because "[t]he appearance of casualness . . . runs starkly counter to the seriousness of purpose that must attend a
criminal trial").
173 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (holding that the appearance of counsel via speaker phone was not the same as no counsel at all and therefore did not prevent effective assistance from being rendered, despite conceding that a long-distance lawyer would
logically not perform as well as one who actually appeared).
174 People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440-41 (Cal. 1989) (indicating that counsel suffered
from an eventually fatal alcoholism affliction which caused him to consume large quantities
of alcohol every day of the trial; he was even arrested for drunk driving on his way to court,
however, the claim was rejected because it "would invite defendants to challenge their convictions on the basis of speculation about the drinking habits of their attorneys"). Contra
Franklin v. State, 471 S.W.2d 760, 762-63 (Ark. 1971) (illustrating that a drunken lawyer
can be found to have provided ineffective assistance of counsel when said lawyer's inebriated courtroom shenanigans are of such a substantial character that jurors "actually consider[]
getting up and leaving the courtroom, because . . . a jury should [not] be required to sit on a
case where the defendants' attorney appear[s], because of intoxication, to be in no state of
mind to be handling a case in court").
17 People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 232 (Cal. 1998), overruled on other grounds by People
v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11, 36 n.22 (Cal. 2009) (finding counsel ineffective when, in the closing
arguments of a capital murder trial, he referred to the juror's community as "a little Podunk
area;" it was deemed an "appropriate argument" designed to cast doubt upon the abilities of
the local criminal investigators and their evidence, regardless of the fact that they were from
the same community as the jurors).
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7 6 the
under New York's standard. Recently, in People v. Irizarry,1
defendant's attorney fell asleep, perused health and fitness magazines
during the testimony of witnesses, and gave a "bizarre" opening
statement. 1 7 7 Despite these shortcomings, the New York Supreme
Court conceded that there was no showing that any actual prejudice
on the outcome resulted from the attorney's behavior.17 8 Irizarry
would not have satisfied the Strickland standard on that basis. In applying Baldi, however, the court recognized a troubling lack of
"meaningful representation."179 Essentially, there was none. Counsel's behavior was unpredictable and discomforting, unsettling the
judge on several occasions.18 0 The court found that the defendant did
not receive the minimum representation that he was entitled to under
the law,' 8 ' illustrating how the application of Baldi can defeat the fallacy that a sleeping, inept, and completely disinterested lawyer can
effectively represent a defendant in a criminal trial. Likewise, New
York has recognized that a defense attorney who consistently lobs insults at the trial judge resulting in heated, personal exchanges also
falls short of effective assistance when considering the totality of circumstances.1 82 Other indiscretions of defense counsel that would
lower the quality of representation below a level that could be described as "meaningful" would justly meet similar fates under Baldi.
The aforementioned examples are evidence of how far courts
applying Strickland or Strickland-like standards are willing to extend
"reasonableness under prevailing ... norms" when forcing a defendant to prove that counsel was ineffective.183 The same kinds of problems arise when a defendant is tasked with proving that counsel's
strategy was unsound. When contemplating the vast universe of dif-

176

No. 6676-2006, 2009 WL 1758769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 15, 2009).

177 Id. at *7.
178 Id. at *8.

179 Id. (citing Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400).
180 Id. at *9.

'8 Irizarry, 2009 WL 1758769, at *9. But see People v. Tippins, 570 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that counsel actually sleeping through the trial is not ineffective per se because it would provide the opposition a trump card that they could play at any
later portion of the trial in the eventuality that things go negatively for them).
182 People v. Torres, 581 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (noting that counsel's
deliberate belligerence towards the judge and the judge's retaliation resulted in an emotionally-charged, confrontational environment that distracted the jury from the real issues of the
trial).
183 Strickland,466 U.S. at 688.
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fering styles, theoretical approaches, philosophies, and methodologies that could be construed as strategic in some way, it becomes difficult to imagine what could not be justified as part of a strategy. "If
a lawyer fails to interview and call witnesses for the defense, how can
it be shown that this lack of preparation was not strategic, e.g., because counsel may have believed that the witnesses would not be

found credible?"1 84
New York is also afflicted by use of a similarly problematic
burden. In New York, "the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the defense counsel rendered effective assistance."1 85
The burden still lies on the ineffectively represented defendant to establish the lack of a strategic basis for counsel's deficiencies.1 86 The
State requires that the defense attorney's strategy be "meaningful"
when evaluated in light of "the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of
the representation."1 87 This appears at least marginally superior to
the requirement in Strickland that strategy be "reasonable,"' 8 but the
distinction is practically indistinguishable. 189 Both standards make it
incredibly difficult to attack any action or inaction by a defense attorney that could be broadly construed as strategic.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In summation, there is an inherent incongruity between the
standard for evaluating the effective assistance of counsel currently
utilized on the federal level and the standard as adopted by the State
of New York.190 The Strickland standard clearly delineates that a defendant must positively prove that, but for the unreasonable ineffectiveness of his or her counsel, the trial would have resulted different-

18 Klein, supra note 112, at 1459.
18 See People v. Chen, 782 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); see also People v.
Fernandez, 776 N.Y.S.2d 512, 512 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
186 People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 220 (N.Y. 2005) (quoting People v. Rivera, 525
N.E.2d 698, 700 (N.Y. 1988) (per curiam)).
Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
188 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681.
18

189Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587 (distinguishing the standard for evaluating strategy in
New York as one that requires strategy be both "reasonable and legitimate . . . under the circumstances and evidence") (emphasis added).
190 Compare Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, with Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
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ly.191 The Baldi standard finds such "but for" causation to be relevant, but not dispositive.192 This is a direct contradiction.'9 3 The
permissive existence of such disharmony should be re-evaluated.
New York State's Baldi approach, however, is preferable to
the federal Strickland standard. It evaluates the totality of the circumstances, independently assesses whether the representation was
meaningful, and does not necessarily require affirmative proof that
but for the grievous errors of counsel, a different result would have
been reached.194 The federal Strickland test, specifically its outcomedeterminative prejudice prong, is simply too burdensome on defendants to effectively be a proper method of ensuring fundamental fairness.' 95 Furthermore, it endangers the due process of defendants who
actually are afflicted with ineffective counsel but are overtly guilty.196
Despite its contradiction with the current trend of federal adjudication, the Baldi standard is the more constitutionally sound approach
to gauging whether the assistance of counsel is sufficiently effective,
and should be adopted by the Supreme Court to apply on a federal
level.

191 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
192 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d. at 588.
193 See Henry, 409 F.3d at 67 (establishing that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

must show that the state's determination was contrary to Strickland).
19 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
1 See Henry, 2009 WL 653051, at *8 ("There is an illogical correlation between our present ineffective assistance standard [as stated in Strickland] . . . and our goal of fair process
and not convicting innocent people and insuring the right to counsel as constitutionally guaranteed.").
196 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that every defendant
is entitled to a vigorous defense, without which there is a violation of due process).
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